We develop a model of corporate dividend policy without agency or signaling considerations.
INTRODUCTION
Disagreement about what a particular piece of information means and what the optimal course of action should be given that information is a fact of life. One reason why there may be disagreement is that information is asymmetrically distributed across agents. Such problems of asymmetric information can create opportunities for signaling (Spence (1974) ) that can be exploited via dividends (Bhattacharya (1979) , John and Williams (1985) , and Ofer and Thakor (1987) ). The other reason for disagreement may be that there is a divergence of interests between the disagreeing parties, so that they may have different optimal courses of action even in the face of identical information sets. Such agency or free-cash-flow problems can also give rise to a role for dividends (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (2000) ).
Disagreement is actually encountered in the real world under much broader set of circumstances. Even two agents faced with exactly the same information and having the same objective function may disagree on the optimal course of action. For example, a CEO may provide the Board of Directors with all the information available to the CEO and yet some directors may disagree with the CEO about the optimal course of action, as in the recent HewlettPackard merger with Compaq. Or a company may have plans to make investments that expand its scope -as in the case of AT&T purchasing TCI Cable -because it views these investments as being consistent with its strategy, and find that its shareholders do not share the company's assessment. In recognition of such possible future disagreement, management will value the "flexibility" to make decisions it views as optimal even when investors do not agree. In this paper, we argue that a firm's dividend policy affects management's flexibility, and thus dividend policy will be influenced by the flexibility tradeoffs perceived by management. We discuss these in a bit more detail later.
There are numerous reasons why agents faced with the same incremental information may fail to come to agreement even when agency and signaling problems are absent. One is that divergent beliefs may not converge because of non-uniform prior beliefs, with insufficient time for objective information to be exchanged for convergence to occur (e.g., Allen and Gale (1999) and Morris (1995) ). Another reason is that the information being exchanged is "soft," subjective or otherwise prone to different interpretations by different agents. For example, Kandel and Pearson (1995) develop a trading model in which different agents interpret the same public information differently, and find that the empirical evidence on the relationship between trading volume and stock returns is consistent with their model. A third possibility is that decision makers often have a tendency to consider problems as unique and ignore historical data in evaluating current plans (Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) ), so that disagreement would be encountered if different agents ignored different pieces of public information. Fourth, agents often tend to ignore information that conflicts with their earlier beliefs, which would impede convergence (White (1971) ). Finally, agents often rely heavily on their intuition and disagree because each agent has a different intuition about the optimal course of action (Clarke and Mackaness (2001) ). Boot and Thakor (2002a) provide an extensive discussion of the many different strands of literatures in economics and psychology that explain the various reasons why people disagree.
The precise reason why people disagree does not matter for our analysis. We take the possibility of disagreement as our starting point and consider situations in which those who disagree with management could block management. We propose that in such circumstances, a firm's management will value the decision-making "elbow room" or flexibility that would permit it to overrule those who object. This means management will make decisions that affect this flexibility. We view the firm's dividend policy as one such decision and explore the consequences. The specific question we address is: how does management's desire for flexibility affect the firm's dividend policy, and what are the testable predictions of this approach?
The basic idea in the model we develop is as follows. In order to isolate the effect of flexibility, we start by assuming management seeks to maximize shareholder wealth, so there is no agency problem, and that there is equal information between management and investors, so that signaling is not an issue. The firm has some cash on hand that management can keep within the firm to possibly finance a project that may come along in the future. Alternatively, the cash can be paid out as a dividend. 1 The tradeoff management faces is as follows. On the one hand, if the cash is kept within the firm, management will have the flexibility to invest in the project in the future even though shareholders may think it is a bad idea. Moreover, no transactions costs will be incurred in raising external capital to finance the project. But not paying a dividend lowers the current stock price. On the other hand, if a dividend is paid, management will not be able to invest even in a project it believes is good if shareholders have to provide the investment capital and they think it is a bad project. Management's dividend policy strikes the optimal balance between these considerations.
Our focus on the application of the concept of flexibility to dividends is motivated by the fact that, although our existing theories of dividends have helped us to cover much ground since Miller and Modigliani (1961) about why and how firms pay dividends, there are still puzzling tracts of terra incognita. We seem to have two dominant theories of why firms pay dividends:
signaling and free cash flow. Bhattacharya (1979) , John and Williams (1985) , Miller and Rock (1985) , and Ofer and Thakor (1987) all develop signaling models in which either taxes or distress borrowing costs create a dissipative cost that makes dividends a credible signal. The free-cashflow hypothesis suggests that since managers cannot credibly precommit to shareholders that they will not invest excess cash in negative-NPV projects, dividend changes may convey information about how the firm will use future cash flows. Easterbrook (1984) , Jensen (1986) , and Lang and Litzenberger (1989) all suggest that increasing dividends ensures that there is less free cash flow 1 The model could easily adapt to include stock repurchase programs since repurchasing shares would also reduce flexibility. However, stock repurchase plans are often discretionary and are not observable by investors, as noted by Howe, He and Kao (1992) . Thus, these plans have a different signaling ability than regular dividend payments. Further, repurchases may be a "one-time-only" payout mechanism, while dividends are often viewed as a consistent future payout mechanism. This consistent payout enforces a reduction in flexibility over time where stock repurchases may not.
available to be wasted on inefficient projects, perks, and the like. The empirical implication from both hypotheses is that firms that increase (decrease) dividends should have positive (negative) price reactions. Indeed, dividend changes have been documented to generate significant stock price reactions.
The empirical support for signaling is somewhat mixed. The evidence that supports the signaling is that stock prices following dividend change announcements have the same signs as the dividend changes and the magnitude of the price reaction is proportional to the magnitude of the dividend change (see Allen and Michaely (2002) ). Bernheim and Wantz (1995) test whether changes in dividend taxation impact the "bang-for-the-buck" of dividend signals. If dividends are used as signals, then when dividend taxation changes, so too should the impact of the signal.
Bernheim and Wantz find a strong positive relation between dividend tax rates and the bang-forthe-buck of dividends. This is consistent with the dividend-signaling hypothesis and inconsistent with other theories (including the free-cash-flow hypothesis). Moreover if dividends communicate information about future earnings, then dividend changes should be followed by earnings changes of similar sign. Empirical support for this implication is provided by Nissam and Ziv (2001) who find, that after controlling for measurement error and omitted correlated variables, dividend changes are positively associated with earnings changes in the two years following the dividend change. However, Bernatzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) find that the relation between dividend changes and subsequent earnings changes are inconsistent with the theory; it appears that dividends are related more strongly to past earnings than future earnings.
Further, there is a significant price drift in years following dividends and, perhaps suggestive of the free-cash-flow hypothesis, it is the large and profitable firms (with less informational asymmetries) that pay most of the dividends (e.g., Fama and French (2001) ).
Allen and Michaely (2002) discuss similarly mixed evidence about the free-cash-flow hypothesis. Evidence supportive of the free-cash-flow hypothesis is provided by Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) who find that firms anticipating declining investment opportunities are likely to increase dividends, and Lie (2000) who finds that firms that increase dividends have cash in excess of that held by peer firms in the industry. However, Yoon and Starks (1995) have uncovered a symmetric price reaction to dividend changes across highTobin's Q and low-Tobin's Q firms, which goes against the free-cash-flow hypothesis.
Our existing theories also do not help us understand why some firms never pay dividends whereas others consistently pay dividends. This suggests that managers are making dividend decisions based not only on the characteristics of their firms but also on their stock prices.
We believe that flexibility considerations may well represent an important missing piece of the puzzle in understanding dividend policy. Our theory generates several predictions that we take to the data. First, dividend payments will be negatively correlated with stock prices.
Second, investors will value dividends more when prices are lower. Third, as the risk of the investment increases, the dividend payment decreases. Fourth, there is a positive correlation between the firm's stock price and its idiosyncratic risk that arises in our model from the endogenous dependence of dividends on stock prices and the endogenous link between the firm's idiosyncratic risk and dividend policy. Fifth, firms with lower debt-equity ratios will have lower dividend payments. 2 Sixth, firms that have lower dividend payments will have higher levels of liquidity. In our model firms keep cash in the firm but do not waste it or consume it. Thus, any excess cash is kept to invest in future projects. Seventh, the more management focuses on the current stock price, the higher is the dividend payment. Eighth, the more dispersed the firm's ownership structure, the higher the dividend payment. Ninth, the higher the transactions cost of issuing new securities, the lower the dividend payout. The existing empirical evidence and our empirical tests provide support for these predictions.
Our paper is related to Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) who find that stock repurchases are pro-cyclical while dividends steadily increase over time. Further, firms increase dividends following good performance while stock repurchases are used following poor performance. The authors interpret their results to be consistent with the idea that repurchases "preserve financial flexibility relative to dividends because they do not implicitly commit the firm to future payouts (pg. 563)." Similarly, in our paper those firms that do commit to pay dividends reduce their future financial flexibility, although our notion of flexibility is different from theirs.
Lie (2001) also finds that firms pay special dividends or repurchase shares when temporary excess financial flexibility (excess cash and lower than optimal debt levels) exists. However, regular dividends increase only when permanent income increases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model and Section 3 contains the analysis. Section 4 summarizes the empirical predictions of the model. Section 5 describes the data, empirical tests and results. Section 6 concludes.
THE MODEL
In this section we describe the model, explain how disagreement may arise and what flexibility means in that setting, and then examine the firm's dividend policy.
Model Description
Preferences and Time Line: There are three points in time and all agents are risk neutral. At t = 0 the firm, which is all-equity financed, has existing assets in place that have both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. With universal risk neutrality, the distinction between these two types of risk is irrelevant for valuation. However, this distinction is useful when we discuss the empirical predictions of our model and later when we take these predictions to the data. At t = 0 the firm's assets in place have an expected value of V at t = 2 that everybody agrees on. Moreover, the firm has cash in the amount of R at t = 0. This cash can be used in one of three ways: it can be paid out as a dividend at t = 0, it can be used to invest in a new project at t = 1 or it can be carried over until t = 2 and distributed as a liquidating dividend. Thus, the key decision at t = 0 is whether to pay a dividend at that time or not.
It is known at t = 0 that a new investment opportunity may arrive at t = 1 that will require financing. If this opportunity arrives and is sufficiently attractive, the firm will invest in it either using the cash it carried over from t = 0 or, if this cash was paid out as a dividend at t = 0, then by raising funds in the market at t = 1.
All payoffs are realized at t = 2. The corporate income tax rate is zero, as is the riskless rate of interest. Thus, there is no discounting of payoffs.
Project Investments and Payoffs and the Dividend Decision: As indicated earlier, at t = 0 the firm has cash of R and assets in place that will have a value at t = 2 whose expectation at earlier points in time is V. The firm's manager must decide at t = 0 the size of the dividend, D, to be paid to shareholders at t = 0. For simplicity, we assume D ∈{0, R}.
At t = 1 a new project arrives with probability θ which was common knowledge at t = 0.
This common-knowledge assumption means that there is no disagreement about the likelihood that a new project will be available, although there may be disagreement between the manager and the shareholders about what it is worth. This project will require an investment of R at t = 1 and will pay off a random amount ξ at t = 2. 3 We assume that
, where 0 < L < R < H < ∞. Thus, the project is worth investing in if the payoff is H, but not if it is L.
Whether the firm will have internal liquidity available to finance the project at t = 1 depends on its dividend decision at t = 0. If D = 0 was chosen at t = 0, the project will be financed out of the firm's internal liquidity. If D = R was chosen at t = 0, the firm will raise $R from investors at t = 1. We assume that doing so incurs a transactions cost of 0.
τ >
We view the new project as possessing characteristics potentially different from the firm's existing operations. It thus has more "unfamiliar" risks and is also subject to greater potential disagreement about its value. Examples are a new business design such as e-Bay's launching of an online auction business, a company's market entry into a new country, an appliance company like Whirlpool experimenting with a new high-end, horizontal-axis washing machine, a biotech company like Amgen researching a new drug, and so on. The basic idea is that the new project is an experiment of sorts, so that its prospects cannot be predicted based on the historical data the way one would predict the future (t = 2) value of the firm's assets in place.
To capture this, we assume that (almost) all of the risk in the payoff on the new project is idiosyncratic. 4 Given universal risk neutrality, thus assumption will not affect any of our formal analysis, but will matter when we interpret the model for the empirical tests.
Disagreement Over Future Payoffs: Everybody agrees that the firm has R in cash at t = 0 and that the assets in place at t = 0 have an expected value of V at t = 2. If the new project is available at t = 1, management as well as investors receive a common signal z about the t = 2 payoff on this project. The interpretation of this common signal may differ across management and investors. Management will interpret the signal as x ∈{L, H} and investors (collectively)
will interpret it as y ∈{L, H}. 5 Viewed at t = 0, x and y are random variables whose conditional probabilities capture potential disagreement between management and investors. We assume Pr(x = H) = q, Pr(x = L) = 1-q, and:
We can interpret equation (1) as follows. The case of ρ = 1 corresponds to x and y being perfectly correlated. We view this as a case of "complete agreement" between management and investors. The case of ρ = 0 corresponds to x and y being perfectly negatively correlated. We view this as a case of "complete disagreement" between management and investors. When the views of management and investors are uncorrelated, we have:
which means that q ρ = corresponds to zero correlation between x and y. We will refer to ρ as the "agreement parameter." The higher the value of ρ , the greater is the likelihood that management and investors will agree on the value of the new project at t = 1. Note that this disagreement is only about assessments at t = 1. All payoffs are publicly observed at t = 2, so there is no disagreement at t = 2.
It is useful at this stage to pause and interpret the interpretations x and y. One way to think about x and y is that they are simply differing opinions about the future realization of a state variable, as in say, Allen and Gale (1999 z s will coincide only some of the time and may differ due to differences in intuition. Their intuitive interpretations of z s can be thought of as arising from the "automaticity of being," as described by psychologists (e.g., Bargh and Chartrand (1999) ) or "deep cognitive activation" (e.g., Wagner and Smart (1997) ), i.e., the ability to arrive at inferences that cannot be supported by documented data. 6 This means that disagreements between management and investors could arise from different interpretations of z s that result in x and y being different, and no amount of communication can bridge this gap. An example of disagreement conditioned on the same information would be the ubiquitous situation of two people placing opposite bets on a particular outcome, like a football game, or a CEO who is convinced an acquisition is right when members of the Board of Directors are not (e.g, the recent HP-Compaq merger). Hence, we are explicitly precluding situations of asymmetric information in which one party knows more than the other, both parties recognize the informationally-advantaged party, and the less-informed party would immediately update his information set if he had access to the information possessed by the better-informed party.
Management's Objective Function:
Management's objective is to maximize a weighted average of the stock prices at t = 0 and t = 2. That is, management seeks to maximize the expected terminal (t = 2) wealth of those who are shareholders of the firm at t = 0, but it also cares about how this terminal wealth is perceived by investors at t = 0. Specifically, management seeks to choose D to maximize:
where 2 P x is the expected value of the firm at t = 2 to the shareholders at t = 0, as assessed by management at t = 0 (i.e., management makes this assessment based on the signal x it expects to receive), and 0 P y is the firm's stock price at t = 0 as set by investors (i.e., investors base this on their assessment of the firm's terminal value at t = 2 using the signal y they expect to receive)
after they have noted the firm's dividend announcement at t = 0. Here β is a positive weighting constant. We refer to η as the "flexibility parameter."
Management's Actions in the
The idea behind this setup is that management calls the shots in running the firm, so if it has the internal liquidity available, it can invest in the project if it believes the project has positive NPV. But this flexibility offered by internal liquidity is not unfettered. Depending on the intensiveness of corporate governance, shareholders may be able to pressure management into rejecting a project they think is a bad bet even if management likes the project. The higher η is, the higher is the probability is that management will be able to overcome such objections by investors and invest in a project it likes when it has the internal liquidity to do so. 
Discussion of the Model
The model described thus far has two essential elements that are important for the analysis that follows. First, we allow management (insiders) and investors (outsiders) to have different assessments of the value of the firm's new project even though both observe the same information signal. This difference of opinions is not something that can be reconciled.
Consequently, even though management is attempting to maximize shareholder wealth, a gap is opened between management's actions on the one hand and shareholder preferences on the other. This is not a problem of asymmetric information (as in Bhattacharya (1979) ). In our model, investors have as much information as management at t = 1. The difference lies in the interpretations of this information. Moreover, agency (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ) and freecash-flow (Jensen (1986) ) problems are also absent in our model since management is attempting to maximize the terminal wealth of initial shareholders without any self interest.
The second essential element is that we view a firm's dividend policy as influencing the flexibility management has in making investment decisions. By paying a dividend, management reduces the firm's internal liquidity, forcing (greater) reliance on external financing in the event that it wishes to invest in a new project. The crucial difference between external and internal financing that we exploit is that the former is simply unavailable if investors do not agree with management that the new project is a good bet, whereas the latter may be used to invest in a project even when investors disagree with management. Thus, an increase in dividend payments reduces management flexibility.
Interpretation of Key Parameters in the Model
There are three key parameters in the model: the agreement parameter ρ , the flexibility parameter η , and the management preference parameter β . We discuss each in turn below.
We view ρ as being affected by the effectiveness and credibility of management's communication with investors. The more persuasive this communication is in conveying management's strategy as well as its views on the firm's investment opportunities, the higher ρ will be. That is, in this framework, one of the challenges for management is to influence investors to interpret payoff-relevant information the way management itself does, and to make sure that relevant information is sufficiently salient in the eyes of investors.
The flexibility parameter η depends on management's track record in delivering performance and building shareholder value. CEOs like Jack Welch of GE and Roberto Goizueta of Coca-Cola were second-guessed far less than their counterparts with poorer track records.
Thus, the better the firm's performance, the greater will be the flexibility enjoyed by its management. That is, more powerful CEOs will enjoy higher values of η . We also expect η to be affected by the firm's ownership structure. Firms with more diffuse ownership structures are likely to have less shareholder intrusion into the management of the firm, and hence higher values of η for management.
Finally, the preference parameter β represents the weight management attaches to the initial stock price relative to the firm's terminal value. The more short-term the orientation of management, the higher will be β . For example, a CEO close to retirement is likely to have a higher β than one with a longer planning horizon.
ANALYSIS
The analysis in this section is in two parts. First, we examine the firm's dividend decision at t = 0 and derive our main result about when firms will pay dividends and when they will not. Second, we do comparative static analysis on the optimal dividend policy and extract testable predictions.
The Optimal Dividend Policy
To understand which firms will choose D = R and which will choose D = 0, we need to compare the values of management's objective function in equation (2) for D = R and D = 0.
If management chooses D = R at t = 0, the value of equation (2) (after the dividend announcement but before the dividend is paid) is:
Note first that if the new project is unavailable, the firm is simply worth R + V, regardless of whether it is management's assessment of the terminal value or the stock price at t = 0, where R is the dividend to be paid and V is the value of the assets in place. In management's objective function, this translates into
β If the new project is available (probability θ), its value to the shareholders at t = 0, as assessed by management, will be [ ] H R qρ − , where qρ is the probability that x = H and y = H (i.e., the probability that management will be able to raise the financing and invest in the project), and the value of the firm will be [ ]
where q τ ρ is the expected transactions cost of raising external financing for the project.
Shareholders will value the firm similarly.
If management chooses D = 0 at t = 0, the value of equation (2) is:
The main difference between equations (4) and (5) is that now management will invest in the new project with probability η even when x = H and y = L, and the probability of this joint event is
[ ] 1 q ρ − . The project value in this case is assessed to be H -R > 0 by management and L -R < 0 by shareholders.
We will assume henceforth that:
This assumption is necessary and sufficient to guarantee that at least some firms will pay dividends. The reason is simple. Suppose β = 0, so management cares only about its own assessment of the initial shareholders' terminal wealth at t = 2. In this case, it would never pay a dividend because paying a dividend entails two costs and no benefits: the loss of flexibility in that the new project must be passed up when x = H but y = L, and the transactions cost τ associated with raising external financing in the state in which the new project is available and both management and shareholders want to invest. From the shareholders' standpoint, however, a dividend payment has a benefit precisely because it reduces management's flexibility. Reduced flexibility means management will not invest in the new project when x = H and y = L. It is this benefit from the shareholders' perspective, reflected in the stock price at t = 0, that creates a role for dividends. With β > 0, management cares about the t = 0 stock price, and hence is willing to pay a dividend in some circumstances if β is large enough. Comparing equations (4) and (5) now leads to our first result. The economic intuition is as follows. As we indicated earlier, if management cared only about the terminal value of the initial shareholders' wealth, it would never pay any dividends.
What creates a preference for paying dividends is management's concern with the stock price at t = 0. Now, when the agreement parameter ρ is low, the shareholders assess a high marginal cost of management flexibility associated with not paying a dividend. Consequently, the decline in the stock price at t = 0 becomes larger as ρ becomes smaller. Even though the benefit of flexibility is also larger when ρ is smaller, the marginal cost associated with the negative stock price reaction to the increased flexibility associated with not paying a dividend exceeds the marginal benefit of increased flexibility to management, given equation (6). Hence, paying a dividend is more attractive to management when ρ is lower. For a sufficiently high ρ , the stock-price-induced marginal cost of flexibility is sufficiently low compared to the sum of the marginal benefit of flexibility to management and the expected saving in transactions cost from not paying a dividend, so no dividend is paid.
Lemma 1: The firm's stock price at t = 0, 0 P y , is increasing in the agreement parameter ρ , regardless of whether the firm announces a dividend at t = 0 or not.
The intuition is simple. As ρ increases, the probability that management will invest in a project shareholders do not approve of declines. So the stock price at t = 0 increases. This now leads to:
Theorem 2: There exists a cutoff level of the stock price at t = 0, 0 P y , such that the firm will be Lemma 1 says that the stock price at t = 0 is increasing in ρ . It follows immediately that dividends will only be paid when the stock price is sufficiently low.
The second part of the theorem is also intuitive. As the stock price at t = 0 declines with ρ , the marginal cost of flexibility as assessed by investors increases. Thus, a dividend payment is more highly valued at lower stock prices.
This theorem has two empirical predictions that we later take to the data. One is that there will be an inverse relationship between stock prices and dividends. The other is that dividends will be more highly valued when prices are lower.
Corollary 1: The probability (assessed at t = 0) that the firm will invest in the new project is lower when D = R is chosen than when D = 0 is chosen. Thus, the probability of investing in the new project is increasing the firm's stock price.
The reason why the probability of the new project being taken is higher when no dividend is paid than when a dividend is paid is that the non-payment of a dividend leaves management with greater flexibility. The fact that this greater flexibility results in a higher probability of investing in the new project follows from our earlier discussion. From Theorem 2 we know that dividend payments are declining in firms' stock price levels. It follows then that the probability of investing in the new project is increasing in the firm's stock price.
Comparative Statics
In this subsection, we analyze the comparative static related to the optimal dividend policy. This theorem is intuitive. As the flexibility parameter η increases, it becomes more likely that management will be able to overrule an objection by investors and invest in the new project even when y = L. This increases the marginal cost to the firm not paying a dividend, as assessed by investors. Consequently, the adverse impact of not paying a dividend on the firm's stock price at t = 0 is greater, leading to a greater propensity for the firm to pay a dividend, i.e., * ρ increases with η .
As β increases, so does the weight management puts on the stock price at t = 0 relative to its own assessment of the expected value of terminal wealth (at t = 2) of initial shareholders.
Management thus attaches more weight in its decision making to the adverse impact of not paying a dividend on the firm's stock price at t = 0. This leads to a stronger preference for paying dividends and hence a higher * ρ .
An increase in the transactions cost τ of raising external financing makes it more costly to pay a dividend, thereby reducing * ρ . Finally, while it may seem surprising at first blush why q, the probability that management will receive a high signal about the project, does not affect the firm's dividend policy, the intuition is as follows. The difference between the costs and benefits of paying a dividend relative to not paying a dividend arises only in the state in which the firm has a new project available and management wishes to invest in it. Since the probability of this state, qθ , is unaffected by whether a dividend is paid or not, this probability drops out in a comparison of the net benefit of paying a dividend with that of not paying a dividend.
It might appear that if management cared solely about the stock price at t = 0, it would always (regardless of the agreement parameter ρ ) pay a dividend. The following result shows that this is not true. That is, despite their aversion to giving management the flexibility to overrule them, shareholders may still want the firm to not pay dividends in some circumstances. The reason why even the initial shareholders may prefer that the firm not pay a dividend is that the shareholders face a tradeoff between the cost of giving the management flexibility by not demanding a dividend and the expected transactions cost that would be incurred in raising external financing if the firm did pay a dividend. When the agreement parameter ρ is sufficiently high, the shareholders assess a relatively low cost of conceding flexibility to management and a relatively high-expected transactions cost of raising external financing. 7 Thus, the shareholders find it optimal not to receive a dividend payment.
It is also intuitive that the optimal agreement-parameter cutoff from the shareholders'
ρ the cutoff that is optimal for management. Shareholders attach only a cost of management flexibility, whereas management assesses both a cost --via the impact of flexibility on the initial stock price --and a benefit to flexibility. Thus, management pays dividends under fewer circumstances than shareholders would like.
EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS
In this section we summarize the empirical predictions that emerge from over analysis.
Prediction 1: Dividend payments will be negatively correlated with stock price levels, i.e., more dividends are paid when stock prices are lower.
This prediction is based on Theorem 2. It is reminiscent of the Baker and Wurgler (2002b) finding that firms' capital structure decisions appear to be driven by their stock price levels. Our analysis predicts that this is true for the dividend decision as well. This prediction also distinguishes our flexibility hypothesis from the free-cash-flow hypothesis and the signaling hypothesis. The signaling hypothesis has no prediction about the correlation between stock prices and dividend payments. 8 While the free-cash-flow hypothesis does not directly speak to any relationship between dividends and stock prices, it indirectly suggests that stock prices should be positively correlated with dividend payments. When firms have higher earnings, their stock prices tend to be higher, and there is also more free cash flow to dissipate. To cope with this freecash-flow problem, firms should pay higher dividends.
Prediction 2: Dividends will be more highly valued by investors when stock prices are low than when they are high.
This prediction also comes from Theorem 2. It indicates that investors will value dividends more highly when prices are low than when prices are high. This prediction is consistent with the findings of Fuller and Goldstein (2002) who find that dividend-paying firms outperform non-dividend-paying firms in bear markets (when prices are low) after controlling for various risk factors.
Prediction 3:
In the cross-section of firms, a firm's idiosyncratic risk is inversely related to its dividend payout.
This prediction follows from Corollary 1. That corollary asserts that the probability of investing in the new project declines as the firm's dividend payment increases. Given our assumption that the risk in the new project is mostly idiosyncratic, so that investing in it increases the firm's idiosyncratic risk, it follows that as the firm's dividend payment increases, its idiosyncratic risk decreases.
Prediction 4:
There will be a positive correlation between the level of a firm's stock price and its idiosyncratic risk.
This predication also follows from Corollary 1. A higher stock price leads to a lower dividend, which then leads to a higher probability of investing in the innovative project, which elevates the firm's idiosyncratic risk.
Prediction 5: Firms with lower debt-equity ratios pay lower dividends. That it, there is a positive cross-sectional relationship between dividends and debt-equity ratios.
This prediction is generated by joining together Theorem 2, which states that higher stock prices lead to lower dividends, and the empirical findings of numerous papers (e.g. Baker and Wurgler (2002b) ) that higher stock prices lead firms to issue equity and causes their debt-equity ratios to decline.
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Prediction 6: Firms that pay lower dividends will maintain higher levels of liquidity (cash and marketable securities). However, the higher liquidity will not be at the expense of operating efficiency.
This prediction arises from the fact that a firm that chooses not to pay a dividend in our analysis retains the cash to maintain the flexibility to make a future investment. That is, the cash is not just dissipated in wasteful spending or stolen by managers. This prediction sharply delineates our analysis from the agency-motivated explanation that a dividend payment is primarily a mechanism to minimize spending inefficiency (Jensen (1986) ) or managerial expropriation (e.g. La Porta et al (2000) ). Thus, in addition to examining the relationship between dividends and liquidity, we could look at the linkage between operating efficiencies and dividend payouts of firms in order to run an empirical horse race between flexibility and freecash-flow as determinants of corporate dividends. The free-cash-flow prediction is that firms that pay less in dividends would have lower operating efficiency since the excess cash kept in the firm would be wasted. Flexibility predicts no relation between dividends and the firm's operating efficiency.
Prediction 7:
The greater is management's concern with the current stock price (as opposed to the future value of the firm), the higher is the dividend paid.
This prediction follows from Theorem 3, which tells us that * , ρ the cutoff agreement parameter below which dividends are paid, is increasing in β , the weight management attaches to the current stock price in its preference function. One possible way to test this would be to examine differences in dividend policies across firms whose CEOs have different planninghorizon durations, as represented perhaps by the number of years to retirement. Another would be to examine if the stock-option component of managerial pay (tied specifically to the future value of the firm) is inversely related to the firm's dividend payments, since an increase in the stock-option component would imply a lower β . Bhattacharyya, Mawani, and Morrill (2002) find that the stock-option component of managerial compensation is significantly and negatively related to the dividends paid by the firm.
Prediction 8:
The more diffuse the firm's ownership structure, the higher is its dividend payout.
This prediction also comes from Theorem 3. According to this theorem, a higher flexibility parameter η leads to an increase in This prediction also follows from Theorem 3. There is significant cross-sectional dispersion in security-issuance costs across firms, 13 so that one could conduct an empirical examination of the relationship between dividend payments and these security-issuance costs.
We do not test this prediction since it is very difficult to reliably measure the all-in securityissuance costs for all forms of capital.
DATA, TESTS, AND RESULTS
We confront these predictions with both dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms from 1980 through 2000. For a firm to be included in the sample, the following criteria must be satisfied:
i) The firm is listed on the Compustat database.
14 ii) The firm is listed on the daily and monthly Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
iii) The non-utility and financial firms had to have an Altman's Z score of 2.68 or greater.
11 They also find that institutional holdings are greater for paying-paying firms than for non-dividendpaying firms. 12 An empirical proxy for CEO power has been recently provided by Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2002) . 13 See, for example, Crabbe (1996) , Lee, Lochhead, Ritter and Zhao (1996) , and Bajaj, Mazumdar, and Sarin (2000) . 14 We access the primary industrial, supplementary industrial, tertiary, full coverage, and industrial research files of Compustat. insert Table 1 here
We begin by examining Prediction 1: when prices are high, dividend yields and dividend payments are low. We define high-price periods as those during which the Standard & Poor's 500 index (SP500) had a positive yearly return, and low-price periods as those during which the SP500 had a negative or zero return for the year. 15 Next we calculate the firm's dividend yield as the yearly dividend (Compustat item #26) divided by the year-end price (Compustat item #24).
We also examine the firms' yearly raw dividend payments, as well as the yearly dividend 15 As a robustness check, we also classified high price periods as bull markets and low price periods as bear markets. To define a bull market, we obtain bull and bear market definitions from Ned Davis Research. Ned Davis Research defines a bull market as an increase of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) of at least 30% over 50 calendar days or a 13% increase over 155 calendar days and a bear market as a decrease of the DJIA of at least 30% over 50 calendar days or a 13% decrease over 145 calendar days. Ned Davis Research classifies each month as a bull or bear market. However, since our data are yearly, we define a bull (bear) market year as a year in which the majority (more than six) of the monthly observations were classified as bull (bear) markets. We also required that nine or more months be classified as bull (bear) markets for the year to be a bull (bear) year. This allowed some months to be fall as neither bull nor bear and these were removed from the analysis for this test. Results were qualitatively similar and are available upon request. payment divided by the firm's financial slack. We measure financial slack as the firm's cash plus liquid securities. We also include the yearly dividend payment divided by the net income for those firms with non-negative net income. For the remainder of the paper, we will refer to the four dividend measures as dividend payouts. We test to see if the dividend payouts in low-price periods are significantly higher than in those high-price periods. Table 2 presents the results of the test of Prediction 1. The dividend payouts are all significantly higher during low-price periods than during high-price periods.
insert Table 2 here
Next we turn to Prediction 2: investors value dividends more when prices are low than when prices are high. We compare the returns of dividend-paying stocks to non-dividend paying stocks for low-price periods, and repeat this comparison for high-price periods. We define a firm as dividend paying if it paid a dividend in that year while a firm that did not pay a dividend is defined as non-dividend paying for that year. Thus, firms can change classification from year to year. In testing Prediction 1, we were constrained to use yearly definitions of low-price and highprice markets since the dividend payouts were defined as yearly payouts. However, since testing Prediction 2 does not directly involve dividend payouts (used only to classify dividend-paying and non-dividend paying firms) but examines firm returns, we can classify low-price and highprice markets based on monthly SP500 returns. A high-price market is defined as a month during which the monthly return on the SP500 was positive, while a low-price market is one where the SP500 posted a negative or zero monthly return. To control for risk we classify each firm into beta deciles where beta was measured using the firm's daily returns for the prior year. Finally, we compare the monthly return for dividend-paying stocks versus non-dividend-paying stocks for each decile for low-price and high-price markets.
As Table 3 Panel A indicates returns are significantly higher for dividend-paying firms than for non-dividend paying firms in low-price markets for all beta deciles. However, non-dividend paying firms significantly outperform dividend-paying firms for high-price markets across all beta deciles.
insert Table 3 here
We also examine the abnormal return for each firm f using the Capital Asset Pricing
Model to determine expected returns. That is, we estimate
where Actual Return f is the return for firm f for that month, r F is the three-month Treasury bill for that month, r M is the return on the CRSP equally-weighted portfolio, and f β is the beta for stock f. We then compare the abnormal returns for dividend-paying stocks versus non-dividend paying stocks in low-price and high-price markets. Again, the results in Table 3 Panel B show that, compared to non-dividend-paying stocks, dividend-paying stocks exhibit higher abnormal returns during low-price markets, and lower abnormal returns during high-price markets.
Another way to test Prediction 2 is to examine dividend changes. We would expect that in low-price markets dividend increases should have higher price reactions than in high-price markets and dividend decreases would have lower (less negative) price reactions in low-price markets than high-price markets. We examine changes (both increases and decreases) in quarterly dividends for 3,496 firms gathered from CRSP from 1980 to 2000. The only restrictions we place on the sample it that there must be five days of returns surrounding the announcement listed on CRSP, the dividend is paid on ordinary common shares of U.S.-incorporated companies, the stock price is greater than $2 per share, and the change cannot be a dividend initiation or omission. Our sample included 11,805 dividend increases and 8,760
dividend decreases. Two-thirds of our decreases occurred from 1990 to 2000 while increases were evenly spread between the 1980s and 1990s. We follow Brown and Warner's (1985) standard event study methodology to calculate CARs for the five-day period (-2, 2) around the announcement date supplied by CRSP. We estimate the abnormal returns using a modified market model:
where r i is the return on firm i and r m is the equally-weighted market index return. We do not estimate market parameters based on a time period before each change since some firms have frequent dividend changes and thus, there is a high probability that previous changes would be included in the estimation period thus making beta estimations less meaningful. Additionally, it has been shown that for short-window event studies weighting the market return by the firm's beta does not significantly improve estimation.
16
As shown in Table 4 , price reactions to dividend increases are less in high-price markets than in low-price markets but dividend decreases have less negative returns if announced during low-price markets than high price markets. Further, dividend decreases announced during lowprice markets have an insignificant impact on the firm's stock price. This is probably due to the fact that cutting a dividend when the market is doing well is a clearer signal that the firm is having problems. However, if a firm cuts a dividend when the entire market is doing poor, there may be less information in the dividend cut or the market views may view the cut as an appropriate step by management to undertake given current economic conditions. 17
insert Table 4 here
Next we examine Prediction 3 that firms that pay less in dividends exhibit lower idiosyncratic risk. Using the market model, we construct a measure of idiosyncratic risk as 16 See Brown and Warner (1980) for comparison of the market model with the market-and-risk-adjusted model. 17 As a robustness check, we divided the sample into the 1980s and the 1990s. We find that the same pattern holds across both decades; firms that increase (decrease) dividends in high-price markets have higher (lower) abnormal returns than firms that increase (decrease) dividends in low-price markets. Similar to Amihud and Li (2002) the abnormal returns are lower in the 1990s than 1980s.
follows. 18 For each stock, we regress the past year's daily excess returns on the market excess return:
where r ft is the daily return t for firm f, r F is the three-month Treasury bill for that month, r Mt is the daily return on the CRSP equally-weighted portfolio, and f β is the beta for stock f. The crosssectional average of the residuals squared is used to construct the measure of average idiosyncratic risk. We define Risk as the measure of idiosyncratic risk computed as:
We quartile our data based on the idiosyncratic risk estimated for each year. That is, for each year we classify each firm into one of four quartiles based on cutoffs for that year. Firms can and do change quartiles over time. Then, we compare the dividend payouts for the four quartiles. We would expect that firms with the lowest idiosyncratic risk would have the largest dividend payouts. Table 5 shows that indeed there is an inverse, monotonic relation between dividend payouts and idiosyncratic risk. Further, dividend payouts are significantly different across the quartiles.
insert Table 5 here Prediction 4 says that a positive correlation exists between the level of a firm's stock price and its idiosyncratic risk. According to our model, firms with price levels greater than the cutoff price will not pay dividends but will take projects that increase idiosyncratic risk. Thus, to test this prediction we must condition on stock prices. We partitioned our sample into higherprice firms, those with prices greater than the yearly median price, and lower-price firms, those with prices less than the yearly median price, and determine the correlation between risk and price. For higher-price firms, the correlation coefficient between stock price and idiosyncratic risk is 0.197, which is significant at the 1 percent level. For lower-price firms, the correlation coefficient is -0.328, which is also significant at the 1 percent level.
Prediction 5 states that debt-equity ratios and dividends are positively related in the crosssection. We calculate the debt-equity ratio as the total debt for a firm divided by the market value of the firm's equity. Again we divide the sample into quartiles based on the firm's debt-equity ratio each year and compare the dividend payouts across the quartiles. Table 6 shows that indeed there is a positive and monotonic relation between dividend payouts and debt-equity ratios. Further, these values of dividend payouts are significantly different across the quartiles.
insert Table 6 here Next, we test Prediction 6 that says first that firms with more liquidity will have lower dividend payments. We calculate the liquidity of the firm as the cash and short-term investments (Compustat item #1) standardized by the firm's total assets each year. We quartile the sample based on the firm' liquidity for each year and compare the dividend payouts across the quartiles. Table 7 reports an inverse and monotonic relation between dividend payouts and liquidity holdings of the firm. Further, these values of dividend payouts are significantly different across the quartiles.
insert Table 7 here
While our results are supportive of the flexibility theory of dividends, we must be careful in interpreting these univariate results. Since our data extend from 1980 to 2000, we need to control for any time trend in the data. Also, there may be interaction between liquidity, D/E, idiosyncratic risk, firm size, operating performance and growth opportunities, which suggests the need for a multivariate estimation. Further, we would also like to test the second part of Prediction 6: the higher liquidity maintained by the lower-dividend-paying firms will not be at the expense of operating efficiency. To test this, we use operating performance as a proxy for operating efficiencies. Following Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002), we measure operating performance as the ratio of operating income to total assets and the ratio of net income to total assets. 19 To control for industry effects, we subtract the industry's median operating performance from the firm's operating performance for each year. 
where Div is the firm's dividend yield (Model 1), the firm's cumulative dividend standardized by net income (Model 2), or the firm's cumulative dividend standardized by financial slack (Model 3), Liq is the firm's cash dividend by total assets, D/E is the firm's debt-to-equity ratio, Risk is the firm's estimate of idiosyncratic risk, OpPer is the firms operating performance (ratio of operating income to total assets or net income to total assets), Size is the log of the firm's market capitalization, Mktbk is the firm's market-to-book ratio, and ε is the ordinary least squares error.
The firm's market-to-book ratio is included as a proxy for growth opportunities of the firm. Model 2 (Div=dividend payment standardized by net income) yields similar results for all variables. However, the F-statistics are lower, though still significant, and the adjusted-R 2 s are much lower. Finally, Model 3 (Div=dividend standardized by financial slack) produces significant results except for Mktbk. However, the adjusted-R 2 is so low that little economic significance can be inferred. Overall, these regressions support the univariate results that firms that have more flexibility pay less in dividends.
insert Table 8 here
CONCLUSION
We develop a model of corporate dividend policy based on the idea that management will value operating flexibility when there is a possibility that shareholders may disagree with management and block management decisions. If the firm pays a dividend, it reduces management's flexibility to invest in projects that it believes are good but which shareholders do not. However, paying this dividend increases the current stock price of the firm. Management trades off these two aspects of dividends. Viewing dividend policy this way as an instrument of management flexibility is consistent with existing stylized facts regarding dividends and generates several new testable predictions.
Our tests of these new predictions produce empirical evidence that is largely supportive of the flexibility theory of dividends. Yet, we believe we have only begun to explore the empirical implications of this theory. Since the theory contains parameters that represent management flexibility and agreement with investors, direct proxies for these parameters will permit more powerful tests. Dividend payouts for 2,407 dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms between 1980 and 2000. Dividend payouts are measured as the firm's dividend yield, the firms' yearly raw dividend payments, the firm's dividend standardized by net income, as well as the dividend payment divided by the firm's financial slack. High-price periods are defined as those during which the SP500 index had a positive yearly return, and low-price periods as those during which the SP500 index had a negative or zero return for the year. Table 6 Relation Between Debt-Equity Ratios and Dividend Payouts Panel A reports the average dividend payouts quartiled by the firm's debt-to-equity ratio for 2,407 dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms from 1980 to 2000. Dividend payouts are measured as the firm's dividend yield, the firms' yearly raw dividend payments, the firm's dividend standardized by net income, as well as the dividend payment divided by the firm's financial slack. Panel B reports the T-tests for differences in means reported in Panel A. The column mean is subtracted from the row mean to calculate the difference reported. For example, for the dividend yield, the quartile-2 mean, 0.0111, is subtracted from the Low D/E quartile mean, 0.0043, for a difference of -0.0068. where Div is the firm's dividend yield (Model 1), the firm's cumulative dividend standardized by net income (Model 2), or the firm's cumulative dividend standardized by cash (Model 3), Liq is the firm's cash and short-term investments divided by total assets, D/E is the firm's debt-toequity ratio, Risk is the firm's estimate of idiosyncratic risk, OpPer is the firms operating performance (ratio of operating income to total assets or net income to total assets), Size is the log of the firm's market capitalization, Mktbk is the firm's market-to-book ratio, and ε is the ordinary least squares error. P-values are in parenthesis below coefficient estimate. • All payoffs realized
Dividend
• Management and investors agree that there is the probability θ that a new project will be available at t = 1
• If the new project is available, management observes a signal x and investors observe a signal y about the payoff on the project at t = 2
• The firm's assets in place will have an expected value V that will be realized at t = 2
• If D = 0 was chosen at t = 1, management can invest in the new project out of internal funds
• If D = R was chosen at t = 1, management must raise external financing at a cost τ to invest in the new project. We will now prove that the marginal value assigned by investors at t = 0 to a dividend payment is higher when the stock price at t = 0 is lower. The improvement in the stock price at t = 0 due to the payment of a dividend -which is the marginal value assigned by investors at t = 0 to a dividend payment -is given by ) 0 ( P ) R ( P y 0 y 0
−
, holding ρ fixed. Using (A-3) and (A-4), we see that:
Thus, the marginal value assigned by investors at t = 0 to a dividend payment is higher when the stock price is lower, since the stock price is increasing in ρ . 
